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Abstract
Recent theoretical works suggest that migrants carry their social networks
when moving across borders and that they bridge the information gap be-
tween partner countries. We derive a theoretical model where migrants reduce
informational trade barriers and thus enhance exports. The model is estimated
using international trade data at a German State-level. We provide evidence
that migrants have a positive and statistically significant impact on bilateral
exports of German States.
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1 Introduction
International trade is costly despite today’s world economic integration. These
costs go well beyond transportation costs as described by Anderson and van
Wincoop (2004). One reason for these costs is the lack of information that pro-
ducers and customers have with respect to conditions on international mar-
kets. Most of the goods traded have no organized market where prices reflect
continuously up-to-date information on the product between buyers and sell-
ers. Furthermore, recent studies using firm-level data have shown that only a
small fraction of firms exports. The evidence also suggests substantial barriers
to exporting (Bernard et al. (2003), Eaton et al. (2004), Tybout (2003)). Ex-
porters tend to be more productive and larger. This advantage allows them to
overcome trade costs, which comprise also the costs of searching and finding
foreign partners.
Recent theoretical literatures propose a departure from the assumption of
perfect information that characterizes classical trade models and model infor-
mation costs as a search and matching process (Rauch and Trindade, 2004;
Casella and Rauch, 2003). Rauch and Trindade assume that social networks
between countries reduce information barriers. In particular, they show that
the information transferred through networks has a positive impact on the
matching process between buyers and sellers located in different countries.
In this paper, we develop a monopolistic competition model that includes
informational trade barriers. We regard migrants as foreign intermediaries
that reduce these information barriers. Migrants convey non-price information
between two distant locations and thus facilitate trade by bridging information
gaps between their home and their host country. Migrants fill the information
gap between two distant places by establishing a privileged link between two
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local networks. They carry information on trade opportunities and share their
knowledge on country’s commercial, legal and political institutions. This is
documented by several empirical studies that include the stock of immigrants
to traditional gravity equations (Gould, 1994; Head and Ries, 1998; Girma
and Sourafel, 2002; Wagner et al., 2002; Combes et al., 2005).
Most of these papers assume that information costs are function of the absolute
number of immigrants in a specific region. As in Combes et al. (2005), we
assume that domestic producers obtain information on business opportunities
abroad through immigrants. However, we depart from Combes et al. (2005)
by assuming that this impact is larger, the higher is the probability to meet
a migrant coming from the partner country. Our information costs variable is
constructed as the stock of immigrant from a partner country relative to the
local population. We believe that this variable is closer to the idea that migrant
close the gap between buyers and sellers located in distant countries. Yet, it
seems unlikely that the impact of immigrants on trade is limited solely to
the information channel. Another potential effect described by Gould (1994)
and Head and Ries (1998) is that migrants have a penchant for the goods
from their country of origin. They increase thus import flows from their home
country in order to satisfy their preferences. Gould shows however that the
effect remains negligible compared to the information channel on which we
focus in this paper.
The methodology we employ is as follow. We first construct a simple trade and
geography model, which is taken from Redding and Venables (2004). We spec-
ify explicitly a trade costs function, which incorporates physical transporta-
tion costs, information barriers and contracting costs. In order to estimate the
model, we apply fixed-effects panel estimation techniques on data on bilateral
export for each of the 16 German States with 45 foreign partners from 1991
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to 2002. This allows to control for any unobservable component of transport
costs or trade policy that is common across all partners and exporting States
(Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004; Redding and Venables, 2004).
We find that German States’ exports to an individual country increase with
the probability of finding migrants from this country. This results is robust
to the inclusion of the fixed-effects and through a wide range of robustness
tests. We provide thus evidence that economic geography matters for bilateral
German State exports.
The paper is structured as follow. In the following section we set out a stylized
model of trade, which incorporate trade costs. In section 3, we discuss the
estimation strategy. In particular, we introduce the specification of our trade
costs function. In section 4, we present the estimation results and undertakes
also a number of robustness tests. We conclude in section 5.
2 A Stylized Model of Trade
The model derived in this section is a stylized version of the Redding and
Venables (2004) trade and geography model. We describe below the theoretical
underpinnings of the augmented gravity equation, which takes into account
networks effects.
2.1 A Standard New Trade Theory Model
We assume that the world consists of i = 1, ..., R countries. There is a manu-
facturing sector in each country, where firms operate under increasing returns
to scale and produce differentiated products. Production requires intermediate
goods 1 . Firms engage in monopolistic competition à la Dixit-Stiglitz. Firms
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export a part of their output because, in each country, a distinct set of differ-
entiated goods is produced. Export is subject to transport frictions in trade.
On the demand side, we assume that each firm produces a differentiated prod-
uct, which is used both in consumption and as an intermediate good. The
model starts with the assumption of homothetic preferences, approximated











, σ > 1 (1)
where ni are the varieties produced in country i and xij is the consumption
by region j consumers of goods from region i. σ is the constant elasticity of
substitution between all goods. In equilibrium, all varieties produced in i are
demanded by country j in the same quantity.
The price index for manufactures in each country, Gj, defined over the prices










, σ > 1 (2)
Let Ej denotes total expenditures on manufacture by country j. By Shephard’s






where pij is the price paid by consumers in j for varieties from i. This price
is the product of the mill price pi and the iceberg trade cost, Tij, paid by
consumers 2 . The own price elasticity of demand is σ and the term EjG
σ−1
j ,
gives the demand curve faced by each firm in market j. It is the market capacity
1 This model follows Fujita et al. (1999) but only focuses on the manufacturing
sector.
2 pij = piTij . If Tij=1 then trade is costless, while Tij-1 measures the proportion of
output lost in shipping from i to j.
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of country j. It depends on the total expenditure in j, Ej, and the weighted
price index, Gσ−1j .
Equation (3) gives the volume of sales per firm to each location, and expressing








The right-hand side of this trade equation contains both demand and supply
characteristics. EjG
σ−1
j is country j market capacity. nip
1−σ
i is the supply
capacity of the exporting country. It is defined as the product of the number of
firms and their price competitiveness. Our variable of interest is T 1−σij , which is
bilateral trade costs between countries. We can thus rewrite the trade equation
This allows the trade equation to be rewritten as (5):
nipixij = φi(Tij)
1−σψj (5)
where ψj and φi represents respectively the market capacity of the importing
country j and the supply capacity of the exporting country i defined as:
ψj ≡EjGσ−1j , (6)
φi≡nip1−σi
The main purpose of this paper is to specify an iceberg trade costs function
between each partner countries. We assume trade costs,Tij, to be a function of




3.1 The Empirical Specification
The theoretical model is estimated using export data between German States
and partner countries. The bilateral export flows depends on German State
characteristics (φi), the partner country characteristics (ψj), and the iceberg
trade costs (Tij). We follow the same methodology as Redding and Venables
and apply a set of State and country dummy variables to control unobserved
economic variables. In the following section, we specify the market and sup-
ply capacity of i and j using their respective Gross Domestic Product. We
show that the introduction of these economic variables does not change the
qualitative results.
The transportation costs, τij, are determined by the bilateral physical distance,
dij and the existence of a state-border, bij, between an individual German
states and the partner country j. While distance should have a negative impact
on trade, the state-border parameter should be positive.
Information costs, Iij, are more difficult to specify. We assume as in Combes
et al. (2005) that producers in State i obtain some information on country
j market thanks to people living in state i but that were born in country j.
However, we depart from Combes et al. (2005) by assuming that this impact
is larger, the higher is the probability to meet a migrant coming from country
j 3 . We are thus closer to the idea that information externalities transferred
through migrants have a positive impact on the matching process between
buyers and sellers located in distant countries. We use the number of foreign
born population from country j, Migij, relative the total population in state i,
3 Combe et al. assume that the network effect is a function of the absolute number
of migrants in a specific region
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Popi, to proxy information costs between i and j. Therefore, the positive effect
of the percentage of migrants on trade should be spatially concentrated at the
State-level. The percentage of migrant from country j relative to the state
population is expected to have a negative impact on trade costs. Moreover,
by using the inward stock of migrants, instead of the immigration flows, we
assume that building a network is costly in terms of time. Migrants have to
learn cultural, social and economic norms and values. This is only possible by
repeated and close interaction with the local population.
To assess the robustness of the results derived using the share of foreign born
from the country of export, we also use the total number of migrants that are
not coming from country j, relative to the State population to approximate
information stocks. Foreigners originated from other countries might provide
information on local business opportunities but do not close the information
gap between each state-country pair.
According to Anderson and van Wincoop (2004), networks substitute weak
international enforcement of formal contract and explain a large part of the
networks effect on trade found by Rauch and Tindade (2002). In order to filter
out this impact from our information costs variable, we include a proxy for
contracting costs. We use an index, which is associated to contract viability
and payment delays in the partner country. The contracting costs variable is
denoted by Cj and should increase trade costs. Since low scores correspond to
high contracting costs, the index enters negatively the trade costs function.
















We estimate a log-linearized version of equation (8). Log-linearizing gives:
ln Xij = φi + ψj + ζln dij + κbij + λln Iij + χln Cj + νijt, (9)
Where Xij is the value of bilateral exports flows from state i to partner j. As
described above, φi and ψj are respectively the German State and country spe-
cific effects which controls for any unobservable component of transport costs
or trade policy that is common across all partners for a particular export-
ing State (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004; Redding and Venables, 2004).
The distance costs parameter [ζ = (1 − σ)γ] is expected to be negative. The
State-border parameter [κ = (1 − σ)θ] is expected to be positive. The infor-
mation costs parameter, [λ = (1 − σ)δ], which enters negatively the trade
costs function, is expected to be positive. Finally, we expect the parameter of
contracting costs, [χ = (1 − σ)µ], to be positive. νijt is the stochastic error
term.
The data imply a specific panel model with two cross-section dimensions,
i.e., the sixteen German State i, i = 1, ..., 16, and the 58 partner country j,
j = 1, ..., 58, and one time dimension t with t = 1, , 10, from 1992 to 2001.
Due to the heterogeneity of the country specific effects, the F-test rejects the
ordinary least squares estimation (test statistic 526.35, p-value 0.000). Turning
to the choice between fixed and random effects, the fixed effects model is
preferred because we want to control for structural determinants other than
the ones associated with the explanatory variables. Generally, our economic
variables vary along the time dimension. The exceptions are the distance and
the State-border variables. Despite the fact that both are time-invariant, we
still find significant effects using the country specific effects panel because of
the unbalanced nature of our panel. Therefore, the distance and the State-
border variables can ”change over time” for a given country.
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While heteroscedasticity in νijt is always a potential problem, serial correla-
tion is likely to be more important, because it affects the standard errors in
fixed-effects models. The residuals of the static trade model exhibit autocor-
relation. This indicates the presence of a sluggish adjustment process. The
Baltagi (2001) LM5 test for autocorrelation rejects the null of no autocorrela-
tion (test statistic 19.07, p-value 0.000). The effect is larger the longer the time
horizon. We used cluster sample methods as describe in Wooldridge (2003).
Essentially, this is a generalization of the Huber-White sandwich variance es-
timator. Instead of dealing with individual observations, we now treat each
cluster or group as if it were a single observation. This robust variance matrix
estimator is valid in the presence of heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.
The robust standard errors are obtained as the square roots of the diagonal
elements of the covariance matrix.
3.2 The Data
A correlation matrix, some summary statistics and more information about
the data sources are presented in Tables (A.1) to (B.1) of the Appendix.
The data on bilateral export flows are available from the German Statistical
Office 4 . The database entails information on bilateral export of each German
state with 58 partner countries from 1992 to 2001. The data are converted in
constant 1995 US dollars using the IFS end of period exchange rate between
German/EURO Mark and US dollars.
We combine the bilateral trade data with information on trade costs. The
distance costs variable is defined as the geodesic distance calculated using
the great circle formula between the capital city of each German state and its
partner country. The State-border variable is a dummy variable that takes the
4 Descriptions of the data can be found in Kuhn (1994)
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value of 1 when the German State shares a common border with the partner
country, and 0 otherwise.
Data on the stock of migrants per country of origin is provided by the German
statistical office, which updates this information by micro-census every year.
Contrary to Gould (1994) and Head and Ries (1998), we do not estimate
the migrants stock. According to German law, people moving across borders
are counted as immigrants if they register with the local registration office
(Einwohnermeldeamt) and if they state that their last country of residency
has been abroad. People are counted as emigrants if they are deleted from the
register because they move to a foreign country. Registration is compulsory.
The data do not include temporary migrants, i.e. people commuting across
borders or staying abroad for only a short period of time.
The contracting costs are approximated by the investment profile index of the
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). The risk rating assigned is the sum
of three subcomponents, contract viability/expropriation, profits repatriation
and payment delays, each with a maximum score of four points and a minimum
score of 0 points. A score of 12 points equates to very low risk while a score
of 1 points to very high risk.
Data on real GDP of German States and the host countries have been respec-




4.1 The Structural Estimation
The results are presented in Table (1). The coefficients are all in accordance
to our predicted signs. As seen by the overall R2, the explanatory variables
explain 50% of the variation of German States’ bilateral exports. In the first
specification (S1), we use the share of foreigners from country j relative the
total population in state i to proxy the information costs while in the sec-
ond specification, (S2), these costs are approximated by the share of other
foreigners in each German State i.
As expected, the coefficient, λ, of the information costs variable in specifica-
tion (S1) is highly significant and positive. It is not statistically significant in
specification (S2). Therefore, we conclude that migrants from the same coun-
try of export help bridging the information gap between an individual German
state and its partner. Contrary to the migrants that are coming from other
countries of export, they do not only know the local market where they live,
but also have information on the country where they come from. In specifica-
tion (S1), a percentage point increase of the share of immigrants from country
j relative to the total State population increases on average the value of ex-
port to this country by about 0.10%. Thus, the economic importance of this
variable is relatively small. To show this, we compute so-called beta-factors,
which measure the contribution of the variance of a given variable to the
overall variance of the dependent variable. In specification (S1), contracting
costs are the most important determinant of export (beta coefficient of about
16%), followed by the distance (8%), and the State-border (3%). The infor-
mation costs are relatively unimportant economically, with beta coefficients
of about 2%. Controlling for contracting costs, the low estimated coefficient
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Table 1
Export Equation: Dependent Variable ln(Xijt), Country-Fixed Effects Panel, 1992-
2001.





Distance Costs dij -0.68∗∗∗ -0.69∗∗∗
(-3.85) (-3.88)
State-border bij 0.41∗∗ 0.42∗∗
(2.65) (2.82)
Information Costs Iijt 0.10∗∗∗ 0.02
(2.71) (1.27)
Contracting Costs Cjt 0.15∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
(9.04) (8.90)
State Dummy φi yes yes
Variables
Country Dummy ψj yes yes
Variables
Observations 8090 8090




∗ denotes statistical significance at 10% level.
∗∗ denotes statistical significance at 5% level.
∗∗∗ denotes statistical significance at 1% level.
Robust t-ratio into bracket. Standard errors have been adjusted
for clustering around the country’s identity
†: Share of migrants from country j as proxy for Iijt
‡: Share of ”other migrants” as proxy for Iijt
on the information costs variable is in line with the expectation of Anderson
and van Wincoop (2004). In fact, the migration variable might capture some
information on enforcement and contracting costs.
The coefficient for the contracting costs, χ, is positive and highly significant.
This positive effect is in accordance with the theoretical model since a high
index reflects low contracting costs. The elasticity of the exports value with
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respect to contracting costs is relatively robust across specification and equal
to 0.15 in both specifications.
Turning to the coefficient of the distance costs variable, ζ, it is significant and
shows the negative impact of distance on the value of export. The elasticity
of the export value with respect to distance is relatively (0.68) in specification
(S1). High distance costs reduce the value of export abroad.
The coefficient of the State-border variable, κ, is significant and has a positive
impact on the value of export in both specification. In specification (S1),
having a State-border with a German States raises export by almost 49% 5 .
However, we should be careful by interpreting the results on the distance
and State-border parameters since they are mainly driven by the unbalanced
nature of our panel. The main results are however robust to dropping the
distance and State-border variable from the regression.
4.2 Robustness Tests
So far, we find evidence that information cost and contracting costs are strong
determinants of bilateral exports of German States. In the following, we test
the robustness of these results. We first supplement the market and supply
capacity of our trading partners by using information on their Gross Domestic
Product (GDP). Thus, the supply (market) capacity of a German States (host
country) is not only defined by its GDP but also by a dummy variable that
controls for all unobserved economic determinants. We also split the full sam-
ple into West- and East-German States. We also split our destination country
into EU- and Non-EU partners. Finally, we drop individual States one-by-one.
5 This is computed using the Kennedy (1981) estimates as:
p̂State−border = 100× (exp{κ̂− 0.5V̂ (κ̂)} − 1) = 100× (exp{0.41− 0.5(0.024)} − 1)
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The parameters on the supply capacity of German States and on the mar-
ket capacity of the host countries have a positive and statistically significant
impact on German State bilateral exports. Moreover, we find that the main
results of the paper are qualitatively not affected by the use of economic vari-
ables. We notice however a drop in the parameter of the contracting costs
variables. This parameter is divided by two compared to the one in specifi-
cation (S1) of Table (1). This is certainly due to the correlation between the
contracting costs and the market capacity variable.
Are the results driven by West-Germany? Until 1990, East-Germany has been
isolated from international markets up until the start of our sample period
(Buch et al., 2003). The share of foreign population in East-Germany was
about 3% in 1991 which makes East-Germany the most homogenous country in
continental Europe (Fearon, 2003). In contrast, West-Germany has the highest
number of foreigners in Europe (Salt, 2001). Therefore, it is reasonable to
expect different effects of information costs on exports from West- and East-
Germany.
The results in Table (2) show indeed quite significant differences between
East- and West-Germany. In particular, most findings reported earlier are
driven by West German States. The quality of the regression is slightly higher
for West-German States, the overall R2 being higher. The distance costs are
above-average for the East-German States and below-average for the West-
German States. State-border is not statistically significant for East-Germany
meaning that the sharing a common border does not matter for East German
States exports.
Turning to the parameter of the information costs variable is positive but not
significant for East-Germany. One possible interpretation concerns the export
pattern and the type of migrants living in East-German States. In fact, firms
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Table 2
Robustness Tests: Dependent Variable ln(Xijt), Country-Fixed Effects Panel, 1992-
2001. (1)
Variables Label Baseline West- East- European Non-
Germany Germany Union European
Market Capacity GDPit 1.85∗∗∗ 1.33∗∗∗ 2.85∗∗∗ 2.01∗∗∗ 1.83∗∗∗
(8.40) (5.75) (8.20) (4.04) (7.70)
Supply Capacity GDPjt 1.69∗∗∗ 1.84∗∗∗ 1.23∗∗∗ 1.67∗∗∗ 1.71∗∗∗
(11.53) (18.37) (6.83) (9.02) (9.44)
Distance Costs dij -0.67∗∗∗ -0.30∗∗ -1.26∗∗∗ -0.53∗∗∗ -0.71∗∗∗
(-3.86) (-2.45) (-4.89) (-3.10) (-2.59)
State-border bij 0.41∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.17 0.27∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗
(2.68) (5.18) (0.58) (4.19) (2.68)
Information Costs Iijt 0.09∗∗ 0.09∗ 0.04 0.17∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗
(2.56) (1.67) (0.76) (2.10) (2.62)
Contracting Costs Cjt 0.08∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗
(4.34) (4.22) (3.43) (3.33) (2.79)
State Dummy φi yes yes yes yes yes
Variables
Country Dummy ψj yes yes yes yes yes
Variables
Observations 8090 5057 3033 1823 6267
Number of Groups 58 58 58 13 48
R2-within 0.80 0.80 0.50 0.89 0.78
R2-between 0.86 0.86 0.78 0.84 0.81
R2-overall 0.75 0.82 0.64 0.77 0.69
∗ denotes statistical significance at 10% level.
∗∗ denotes statistical significance at 5% level.
∗∗∗ denotes statistical significance at 1% level.
Robust t-ratio into bracket. Standard errors have been adjusted for clustering around the
country’s identity
in East Germany tend to export to countries independently of the the stock of
migrants. As mentioned earlier, networks are costly to form and East-Germany
was isolated from international factor markets. This may explain why we do
not find any significant information costs parameter for East-Germany.
In addition to difference between East- and West-Germany, we might also
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expect structural differences between large German State and smaller States
like Hamburg and Bremen. To assess the robustness of our results, we drop
observation from each individual States successively 6 . We essentially obtain
the same qualitative results as earlier.
Finally, we split our full sample into European and non-European member
countries. The qualitative results are roughly the same for both groups. The
distance costs are above-average for the non-European members and below-
average for the European members. Turning to the information costs para-
meter, they are statistically significant for both the European and the non-
European members. However, the impact of the information costs variables is
largely above the average for the European members.
5 Conclusion
We develop a structural gravity equation model, for which we specify a trade
costs function. We assume trade costs to be determined by the physical trans-
portation costs, informational trade barriers and contracting costs. We focus
on informational trade barriers between two countries, i and j, which are as-
sumed to be reduced by local networks. The latter is proxied as the percentage
of migrants over total population in country i coming from country j.
Estimates based on bilateral export flows of German States show that geog-
raphy matters. In particular, we find that German State’s bilateral exports to
country j are larger, the higher is the probability to meet a migrant coming
from this country. This result has quite important implications for Germany
since the location of migrants shape the exports of its States. The impact is
statistically significant and positive but remains economically negligible with
respect to the contracting costs and the physical transportation costs.
6 The results are available upon request.
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We present a variety of robustness tests, which provide additional evidence
that migrants coming from the same country as the country of export bridge
information between distant locations. Results are find to be robust to the split
of our full sample into European and non-European union members. However
the results are mainly driven by West-German States.
Two interesting extension come two mind. First, as in Combes et al., the model
could be extended to include business networks using information on the num-
ber of German affiliates of foreign multinational firms located in each German
State. Second, the estimated parameters of distance costs and State-border,
rely on the unbalanced nature of our panel. A Hausman-Taylor approach could
be appropriate to estimate consistently the time-invariant parameters.
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Appendix
A Correlations and Summary Statistics
Table A.1
Correlations of variables
ln(Xijt) ln(ψj)† ln(φi)‡ ln(dij) bij Iij Cjt
ln(Xijt) 1.0000
ln(GDPjt) 0.6328 1.0000
ln(GDPit) 0.5463 0.0016 1.0000
ln(dij) -0.3452 0.0186 0.0011 1.0000
bij 0.1794 0.0846 0.0412 -0.2308 1.0000
Iij 0.1944 0.1179 0.0791 -0.0776 0.0485 1.0000






ln(Xijt) Overall 10.826 2.287 1.435 17.359 N = 10254
Between 1.728 7.428 14.251 n = 67
Within 1.562 3.857 15.198 T̄=9.565
ln(dij) Overall 7.751 1.076 4.248 11.265 N = 10720
Between 1.068 5.838 9.818 n = 67
Within 0.181 6.161 9.936 T = 10
bij Overall 0.014 0.118 0.000 1.000 N = 11360
Between 0.041 0.000 0.188 n = 71
Within 0.111 -0.173 0.952 T = 10
Iij Overall 0.106 0.365 0.000 9.239 N = 10683
Between 0.268 0.002 2.048 n = 68
Within 0.248 -1.932 7.296 T̄= 9.819
Cjt Overall 6.941 2.077 1.000 12.000 N = 9760
Between 1.359 2.333 10.000 n = 66




Variables description and data sources
Description Source
ln(Xijt) Log of real export of German State i to country
j at time t
German Statistical Office,
Several Edition
ln(ψj) Log of real GDP of Country j World Development Indi-
cators
ln(φi) Log of real GDP of State i German Statistical Office,
Several Edition
ln(dij) Geodesic Distance between the main city of
State i and the capital of country j
Own Computation†
bij Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the
German state shares a common border with its
exports partner, and 0 otherwise
Own Computation
Iij Number of foreigners in Germany by country of
origin and German States
Bevölkerung Statistik
Fachserie 1 Reihe 2
Cjt The risk rating assigned is the sum of three sub-
components, contract viability/expropriation,
profits repatriation, payment delays, each with
a maximum score of four points and a minimum
score of 0 points. A score of 12 points equates
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20
References
[1] Anderson, J.E., van Wincoop, E., 2004. Trade Costs. Journal of Economic
Literature 42 (3): 691-751
[2] Baltagi, B., 2001. Econometric Analysis of Panel Data. Second Edition,
John Wiley & Sons, Chichester.
[3] Bernard, A.B., Eaton, J., Jensen, J.B., Kortum, S., 2003. Plants and
Productivity in International Trade. American Economic Review 93 (4):
1268-90
[4] Buch, C.M., J., Kleinert, F., Toubal, 2003. Where Enterprises Lead, Peo-
ple Follow? Links Between Migration and German FDI. Kieler Working
Paper 1190
[5] Casella, A., Rauch, J., 2003. Overcoming Informational Barrier to Inter-
national Resource Allocation. Prices and Ties. Economic Journal 113(1):
21-42
[6] Combes P.P., Lafourcade, M., Mayer, T. 2005. The Trade-Creating Ef-
fects of Business and Social Networks: Evidence from France. Journal of
International Economics, forthcoming
[7] Eaton, J., Kortum, S., Kramartz, F., 2004. Dissecting Trade: Firms, In-
dustries, and Export Destinations. American Economic Review 94 (2):
150-154
[8] Fearon, D.J., 2003. Ethnic and Cultural Diversity. Journal of Economic
Growth (8): 195-222
[9] Fujita, M., P.R., Krugman, A.J., Venables, (1999). The Spatial Econ-
omy.Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
[10] Girma, S., Yu, Z., 2000. The Link between Immigration and Trade: Evi-
dence from the UK. GLM Working Paper 23, School of Economics, Uni-
versity of Nottingham.
[11] Gould, D.M., 1994. Immigrant Links to the Home Country: Empirical
Implication for US Bilateral Trade Flows. Review of Economics and Sta-
tistics 68 (4): 811-848
[12] Head, K., Ries, J. 1998. Immigration and Trade Creation: Econometric
Evidence from Canada. Canadian Journal of Economics 31 (1): 47-62.
[13] Kennedy, P.E., (1981). Estimation with Correctly Interpreted Dummy
Variables in Semilogarithmic Equations. American Economic Review :801
21
[14] Kuhn, A., 1999. Aussenhandel und Informationsbedarf der Bundesländer.
Wirtschaft und Statistik (4): 306-311
[15] Rauch, J.E., Tindade, V., 2002. Ethnic Chinese Networks in International
Trade. Review of Economics and Statistics 84 (1): 116-130
[16] Redding, S., Venables, A.J., 2000. Economic Geography and International
Inequality. CEP Discussion Paper 495. London School of Economics.
[17] Redding, S., Venables, A.J., 2004. Economic Geography and International
Inequality. Journal of international Economics 62 (1): 53-82.
[18] Salt, J., 2001. Patterns and Trends in International Migration in Western
Europe. Official Publication of the European Communities, Luxemburg
[19] Tybout, J.R., 2003. Plant and Firm Level Evidence on New Trade The-
ories, in Choi, E.K., and Harrigan J., eds. Handbook of International
Trade. Oxford, U. K.: Blackwell, 338-415.
[20] Wagner, D., Head, K., Ries, J., 2002. Immigration and The Trade of
Provinces. Scottish Journal of Political Economy 49 (5): 507-525.
[21] Wooldridge, J.M., 2002. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel
Data. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
[22] Wooldridge, J.M., 2003. Cluster-Sample Methods in Applied Economet-
rics. American Economic Review 93 (2): 133-138.
22
